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Data Details on key variables
The main explanatory variable -the share of CPSU members in the regional population in 1976 -was obtained in the following way. Unfortunately, the Soviet statistics did not publish any information in this respect; however, there is a way to obtain a rather precise estimate of how widespread the CPSU membership was in different regions. The CPSU was officially governed by the party congresses, which included delegations from all regional party organizations. The number of delegates from each organization was proportional to the party membership in the region: one delegate was sent from 3,000 Communists (for the congress we look at). The full lists of congress delegates are available. Hence, we count the size of the delegation from each party organization, multiply it by 3,000 and divide by the regional population. We use the XXV party congress of 1976: the choice of this particular congress is because it convened precisely in the middle of the Brezhnevs Stagnation era, long before the start of Gorbachevs reforms and long after turbulences of the period of Stalin and Khrushchev.
The main dependent variable of this paper -the index of real corruption, was published by the Fond Obshestvennoe Mnenie (FOM) based on the survey implemented in 2010. The survey took place in October 2010 in 70 regions of the Russian Federation. The overall sample consists of 17,500 respondents with 250 respondents per region. The set of respondents was obtained through three-stage stratified sampling (sub-regional districts -cities, towns and villages -households) and thus was designed as representative within each region. The final index was computed as a weighted average of responses to four key questions:
• Share of respondents, who have at least once encountered a situation, where they were expected or requested to pay a bribe by public officials, in the total number of respondents, who had to interact with public officials
• Share of respondents, who have been requested to pay a bribe during their latest interaction with public officials
• Share of respondents, who have paid a bribe last time they were requested to pay a bribe by public officials
• Sum of bribes paid by the respondents during the last year (computed as the product of average number of bribes paid and the average bribe paid reported by the respondents), computed as share of the average monthly income in the region
The resulting index was normalized to vary between 0 and 1, with 1 being the highest level of corruption.
Thus, the advantage of the dataset is its thorough coverage of a broad set of Russian regions, making it possible to obtain an estimation of bureaucratic corruption for most of them (specifically, for the street-level bureaucratic corruption). The limits of the dataset are associated with the fairness of responses (respondents may be unwilling to report their corruption experience, although the widespread corruption in Russia, which is more socially acceptable than in developed countries, could make this problem less pronounced); we partly resolve this problem by using other types of proxies as described below.
In addition, the FOM computed a further index of perceived corruption: the average assessment of corruption of respondents in a particular region for 16 institutions and types of interaction with government: universities, traffic control, military draft, work, pre-school facilities, courts, schools, public medical assistance, acquisition of land, police, official documents (passports etc.), housing, registration of real estate transactions, communal services, social benefits and pensions. Unlike the previous index, this index does not ask the respondents to report their own corruption experience and rather to provide information on their expectations regarding the corruption level in particular situations. The index, again, was normalized to vary between 0 and 1 with 1 being the lowest expectation of corruption, we have re-calculated it as 1 minus original index to make it compatible with other indices.
In order to check the persistence of the impact of CPSU membership over time, we also use several other datasets. In October 2002 Transparency International (TI) jointly with INDEM implemented a survey of corruption in 40 regions of Russia. The survey covered 5,666 individuals and 1,838 small and medium entrepreneurs. As an outcome, TI published two indicators: index of real corruption and index of perceived corruption. Index of real corruption was obtained based on two indicators: (a) the size of bribes paid by households in the region relative to the regional GDP (this indicator was obtained based on the following characteristics: share of respondents, who reported to have paid a bribe; share of respondents, who reported that they paid a bribe last time they were requested one; average number of bribes; and average value of bribes) and (b) the size of bribes paid by businesses in the region relative to the regional GDP (this indicator was obtained based on responses to the following questions: average value of a bribe paid; and average value of a bribe). The index of perceived corruption was obtained based on responses for following questions: (1) trust into government in the region; (2) overall assessment of the level of bribery in different public institutions; (3) assessment of business corruption by businessmen and (4) assessment of corruption by households. Both indices are normalized to vary between 0 and 1 with 1 being the highest expectation of corruption.
Second, in May 2011 FOM performed a further survey on corruption covering 72 regions. The question asked was whether respondents have been recently requested to pay a bribe from public officials. We use the share of respondents, who gave a positive response to this question, as a further corruption measure, which we refer to as index of real corruption 2011.
Third, in 2004 the Carnegie Center in Moscow published an index of corruption in all Russian regions. The index was computed for 2000-2004 and was based on expert opinion surveys. Unlike other indices, it focuses on political corruption and not on corruption in the bureaucracy; furthermore, it applies a rather restrictive definition of corruption, associated with bribery in political process. The original index was computed on a 5-point scale, with 5 being the lowest corruption level; in this paper we re-calculated it as 6 minus original index, such that higher values of the index correspond to the higher level of corruption. Note on sources of data 1. The dataset includes almost all Russian regions, with minor exceptions, for which no corruption data for 2010 is available (Buriatia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Sakha, Ingushetia, Kalmykia, Tyva; in the robustness checks for other datasets, if data for these regions was present, the regions were included). We also exclude Chechnya and the autonomous okrugs due to the limited availability and reliability of most control variables, as it is standard in econometric analysis of Russian regions. 3. Education level in the main regressions is captured by the share of population with university degree: we use this proxy since the primary and secondary schooling in Russia covers almost the entire population and there is less variation for this variable.
Robustness checks
To validate the main results of the paper, the following robustness checks have been implemented:
Timing of control variables: In the main specification we apply control variables from the year 2009, i.e. the latest year for which all control variables we use are available (thus, we regress the corruption variable on a one-year lag of all controls). In the robustness checks we, first, replace all control variables by the average values for 2000-2009, to account for the fact that 2009 values can be driven by coincidence and the corruption should be driven by rather long-term characteristics of the regional economies (Table A1) ; and second, replace all control variables by the variables for the year 2010 (i.e. the year when the corruption data was collected), if possible -some variables are not available for 2010 ( Table A2 ). Note that for education and share of ethnic Russians this adjustment is not needed, since the data is not available on annual basis (only once a decade from the Census), and dummy republic and distance between the regional capital and Moscow do not change over time. The results are confirmed in all regressions.
Alternative corruption data:
We replicate our results for the following alternative corruption measures: ; we had had to replace the share of extraction industry in the GDP of the region by the ratio of the value of oil and gas extraction in the region (evaluated at average export prices) to GDP of the region, given the data availability; since the dependent variable is a count variable, we estimate regressions using not only OLS, but also ordered logit. The results are confirmed in all regressions. Tables A6 and A7: real corruption 2002 ; unfortunately, the sample is in this case very small, and thus we were forced to add controls separately from each other to ensure that we have sufficient degrees of freedom; in addition, we did not control for dummy republic and ethnic structure, since the 2002 survey included only 4 ethnic republics (Karelia, Tatarstan, Bashkortostan and Udmurtia) -we will, however, replicate the regressions excluding these four regions in the next robustness check; as in case of the real corruption 2010, we replicate regressions using we add any further control variables or exclude Bashkortostan. Since the index is poorly correlated with other indicators we have used, the absence of significant results is not surprising.
Alternative samples and log-odds transformation: Our main regressions were estimated only for regions, which had separate delegations during the CPSU congresses. The borders of most of the Russian regions were inherited from the Soviet period, so there are no difficulties with matching these datasets. There are, however, some exceptions. Therefore, we had to exclude the following regions: (1) Leningradskya oblast and the City of St. Petersburg (which formed a single region -Leningradskaya oblast in the USSR); (2) autonomous oblast and regions, which became separate republics or full-fledged constituent units of Russia in 1990-1991 (Chukotka autonomous region, Evreyskaya autonomous oblast, Adygeya, Altai, Karachaevo-Cherkessia and Khakassia republics -in the Soviet period they were sub-divisions of other regions).
Thus, we replicate our results for the following additional samples (Table A8) : (1) we add Leningradskaya oblast and St. Petersburg, assuming that each of them had the same share of the CPSU members in 1976 as the whole Leningrdskaya oblast; (2) we add former autonomous oblast, assuming that they had the same share of CPSU members as the region they belonged to in the USSR. We understand that this assumption may be debatable (especially for sample (2)), and thus the results of these estimations should be treated with caution.
Furthermore, two additional samples were estimated to deal with outliers: (1) we excluded City of Moscow, which had an extremely large share of the CPSU members; (2) we excluded ethnic republics, which exhibited partly very different development trajectories than the rest of Russia (Table A8) .
Finally, we estimated the regressions using the log-odds transformation of the dependent variable, since it is bounded between 0 and 1 (Table A9 ).
All modifications entirely confirm our results.
Additional control variables:
In Table A9 we add a number of further control variables to account for alternative explanations of our results.
First, the impact of the CPSU members could be conditional on the demographic structure: we control for the share of elderly population of the region and the share of young population (elderly is defined as being older than 60 for male and 55 for female; young is defined as being younger than 16 years).
Second, the results could be driven not by the legacies of the CPSU membership, but by the contemporary influence of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF), one of the strongest political forces in the country: we control for the share of CPRF at various federal parliamentary elections in the last decade and a dummy for the Red Belt regions, i.e. territories in the 1990s ruled by Communist governors. Specifically, we look at the elections of 1999 (the last competitive elections of the Yeltsin era before Putin's regime) and 2011 (the most recent Duma elections). Red Belt includes Briansk, Ivanovo, Kamchatka, Krasnodar, Kursk, Orenburg, Ryazan, Stavropol, Vladimir, Volgograd and Tula.
Third, the effect we find could be spurious, if the CPSU membership was higher in the regions, which always receive higher attention of the center, in 1976 as well as in 2010. To capture the federal attention we control for the number of visits of the president of Russia to each region in 2008-2011.
Fourth, we control for the industrial structure of the region (captured by the GDP and employment structure).
Our results are, again, entirely confirmed.
Determinants of CPSU membership:
The final problem we encounter is a possible omitted variable bias: the penetration of the CPSU membership in 1976 was not random, but could have been driven by region-specific characteristics, which, in turn, could have affected contemporary corruption. To capture these effects, we control for a broad set of variables from the Soviet statistics, which could have affected the spread of the CPSU membership (Tables  A10 and A11 ).
First, we control for the territory, population and urbanization of the region in 1977, to capture the level of its development and attention of the central government.
Second, we also control for the earliest available (1985) data on monthly income per capita (regional income per capita was not reported in the Soviet statistics before that).
Third, we replace this variable by other proxies for development, which are available for the mid-1970s: per capita retail trade volume, per capita housing construction and per capita number of doctors. Unfortunately, data is not always available for 1976, hence we had to use other (proximate) years as possible substitutes.
Fourth, we control for demographic structure: natural population growth rate and infant mortality. Membership in the CPSU was typically permitted only from a certain age, hence, it is necessary to implement this robustness check.
Fifth, we control for the educational structure of the population (this is also a way to capture the social structure) using two datasets: the share of people with different educational degrees in the population and in the labor force according to the Census data and the share of students of different types of educational facilities in the regional population.
Sixths, we add a dummy variable for regions at the borders of the USSR, where military installations were located -it could have affected the number of Communists, since party membership was widespread among veterans and military personnel. We should also stress that regions populated by peoples repressed by Stalin, but re-created under Khrushchev (Ingushetiya, Kalmykia, Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachaevo-Cherkessia), are not in our sample due to data availability -the exceptions are the 2011 real corruption index and the 2000-2004 expert index of corruption, but if we re-estimate our regressions excluding or controlling for these regions, results do not change. Sevenths, we add the earliest available data on total industrial production per capita and the number of crimes committed per capita.
We estimate two specifications: first, controlling for the contemporary variables (unemployment, income per capita, population and urbanization in 2009) (Table A10 ) and second, excluding these variables (Table A11) . We use the second specification, first, to avoid the multicollinearity problems (current economic development can be a function of Soviet development as well, especially with variables basically measuring the same characteristics of the region in the 1970s and in the 2000s), and second, to avoid the problem of possibly endogenous controls (if contemporary corruption affects contemporary income etc.).
These additional specifications confirm our results.
Standardized coefficients: Figure A1 reports the standardized beta coefficients for specification (2) of Table 1 of the main paper: this is done to show the magnitude of the effect of the CPSU membership as opposed to other determinants of corruption. Note: *** significant at 1% level, ** 5%, * 10%. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Income per capita computed in 2000 price level using region-level CPI Note: *** significant at 1% level, ** 5%, * 10%. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Income per capita computed in 2000 price level using region-level CPI. Value of oil and gas extraction to GDP obtained in the following way: ((Total extraction of oil * Average export price of oil, USD) + (Total extraction of gas * Average export price of gas, USD)) / (GDP). Value of resource extraction in millions of USD, GDP in thousands of USD; export price reported by the Russian Central Bank Note: *** significant at 1% level, ** 5%, * 10%. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regressions (6) and (8) 
